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III. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Statement of Facts 
The fo llowing is a summary of pertinent facts as set forth by this Court in Hull v. Giesler, 
156 Idaho 765 ,331 P.3d 507 (20 14) ("Hull I"). In 2005, Richard Giesler ("Rick") began 
negotiations with Gregory Hull ("Hull") to purchase I 4 7 acres of irrigated fannland (the 
"Property") from Hull. The parties entered into a Purchase and Sale Agreement for the Property 
wherein Hull agreed to sell to Idaho Trust Deeds LLC ("Trust Deeds"), approximately 150 acres 
for $375,000. Giesler is the sole owner of Trust Deeds. 1 The purchase agreement provided that 
the purchase price included: all existing fixtmes and fittings attached to the Prope1ty; all water 
systems, wells, spring water that are now on or used in connecti.on with the Property; irrigation 
fixtures and equipment, and; any and all water, water rights, ditches, and ditch rights that are 
appurtenant and used in connection with the Property. Additionally, the purchase agreement 
included a merger clause. 
Before closing of the sale of the Property, Hull and Giesler signed an addendum that 
extended the closing date, specified the Property was 14 7 acres, and reduced the purchase price 
to $367,500.00. Giesler thereafter paid $367,500.00 in cash at closing. Giesler borrowed 
$183,748.00 of that purchase price from D.L. Evans Bank in four loans (collectively, the "Bank 
Loans"). Those loans were to be paid over fifteen years and carried variable interest rates, with a 
total annual payment of $20,107.46 due April 20111 of each year. Hull signed a warranty deed that 
conveyed the Property to Giesler. 
Giesler plrurned to develop residential subdivisions on the Prope1ty. Sometime after 
closing, Giesler agreed to give Hull a contingent one-half interest in the future profits from the 
1 Rick and Trust Deeds are herein collectively referred to as "Gies ler." 
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developed Property in exchange for Hull agreeing to timely make the payments due on the Bank 
Loans. Hull also stayed on the Property pursuant to an oral agreement to farm the undeveloped 
Prope1iy in exchange for rental payments to Giesler. Hull later sold his interest in one-half the 
profits of a certain 40 acres of the Property (which 40 acres are known as the Belmont/Emerald 
subdivision) to Giesler. 
Following development of the Belmont/Emerald subdivision, the real estate market 
soured. Giesler platted part of the remaining 107 acres of the Property and drafted a subdivision 
plan. However, Giesler did not complete development the 107 acres at that time. In 2012, 
Giesler evicted Hull from the Property. Also in 201 2, Hull removed all of Giesler's irrigation 
equipment from the Property. Since that time, Giesler has resumed development of subdivisions 
on the Property. 
B. Course of Proceedings 
Hull filed a Verified Complain! against Giesler on May 23, 2012, alleging 1) that he had 
an w1divided one-half interest in the Property; 2) Giesler was only conveyed title to the Propetiy 
to be held in trust; and 3) that Hull was wrongfully evicted from his farming operations on the 
Property pursuant to an oral lease agreement. (R. Hull I, pp. 6- 14.) Hull requested that 1) he be 
restored to hjs leasehold possession or awarded damages; 2) the District Cou11 declare that the 
Property was held by Giesler in an express trust and that Giesler be required to deed back a one-
half interest in the Property to Hull; 3) that the District Court declare that one-half of the 
Property be held in a resulting trust in favor of Hull; and 4) that the District Comt declare that 
the Property be held in constructive trust in favor of Hull. (R. Hull I, pp. 14-15.) 
Giesler denied the allegations of the Verified Complaint and raised allegations against 
Hull for 1) breach of contract and unjust enrichment arising out of Hull ' s failure to pay certain 
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loans, farm rent and expenses, and other miscellaneous expenses; 2) conversion arising out of 
Hull 's removal of certain irrigation equipment from the Property that was included in the orig inal 
sale of the Propeity; and 3) unlawful detainer arising out of Hull 's continued possession of the 
Property. (R. Hull I, pp. 53- 57.) The parties resolved the unlawful detainer issue shortly after 
the filing of the Answer and Counterclaim. 
The case was tried to the District Court on June 4 to 6, 2013, following which the District 
Court entered a Memorandum Opinion and Judgment. (R. Hull 1, pp. 188- 229.) The District 
Court found that Hull and Giesler entered into a verbal agreement after the sale pursuant to 
which Giesler would develop the Property at his own cost, subject to reimbursement, and give 
Hull one-half the profits from such development. Hull I, 156 Idaho at 771. In exchange, Hull 
would pay back the Bank Loans. Id. The District Comt also noted that Giesler's buy-out of 
Hull 's interest in 40 acres left only the remaining 107 acres subj ect to the oral agreement. Id. 
With respect to the irrigation equipment, the District Court fo und the equipment to be valued at 
$25, 122.00, which amount it ordered Hull to reimburse Giesler. Id. 
The District Court ordered Giesler to develop the remaining Propetiy, and ordered Hull to 
timely pay the Bank Loans. The District Court also set forth various penalties the parties would 
be subject to if they failed to abide by the oral agreement and the corut's orders. Id. 
Specifically, the Distri ct Court determined that if Hull failed to timely pay the loans, he would 
forfeit his interest in the developed Property's profits. Id. The District Court ordered Giesler to 
complete all infrastructure to make the subdivision marketable and zoning compliant. Id. The 
District Court further detailed that Giesler was to develop the I 07 acres in tlu·ee phases in three 
years. Id. 
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The District Court further ordered that Giesler must take reasonable efforts to sell the lots 
in the developed subdivisions and to pay to Hull one-half the net profits of each lot sold. Id. at 
772. Net profits were defined as the gross sales price of each lot less selling costs, less the 
original land acquisition price, less the pro-rata share of development costs, plus the value of the 
irrigation equipment that would have been sold as that specific lot was developed.2 Id. The 
District Court also set forth that if Giesler did not develop the Property as ordered 1) Hull could 
stop his payments on the Bank Loans, and 2) the 107 acres would be sold and the sales proceeds 
divided equally between Giesler and Hull, without reimbursement to Giesler for his development 
costs. Id. Giesler appealed from the District Court's rulings. (R. Hull I, pp. 247- 52.) 
In Hull I, this Court upheld the District Court's finding that Hull had an equitable interest 
in the profits from the sale of developed lots in the I 07 acres (but no interest in the actual real 
estate), and that neither party had breached their contract. Hull 1, 156 Idaho at 773- 74. This 
Court vacated the portions of the District Court 's decision 1) ordering Hull to pay Giesler one-
half of the inigation equipment's value; 2) setting deadlines for development of Parcels 2 and 3 ; 
3) imposing forfeitures as a remedy for future breaches of the parties' contract; and 4) 
prohibiting Giesler from further encumbering the Property. Id. at 775- 80. This Court 
remanded the case to the District Court to enter orders and conduct further proceedings in 
accordance with the decision in Hull !. Id. at 780. 
Following remand, the District Cowt entered an order l ) directing that as each lot is sold 
Giesler shall receive, as an expense of sale, one-half of the value of the irrigation equipment that 
2 The Disnict Court noted that such definition did not foreclose inclusion of other development-related costs later 
identified by the parties. Id. at 772 . 
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would have been retired at the time of the sale3• 2) a trial would be set for the purposes of taking 
testimony and evidence from which to determine a reasonable time for developing Parcels 2 and 
3; and 3) providing that the District Court wou ld retain jurisdiction of th is ma tier until all lots are 
sold and full accounting has been concluded. (R. pp. 20-22.) 
On November 12, 2014, the parties entered a Stipulation on the Issue of Reasonable time 
to Compete Subdivision Phases. (R. pp. 24- 26.) That stipulation provided that the remaining 
undeveloped portions of the Property be divided into various phases (the first to be completed by 
October 31, 2016), with development of each phase be completed in a one-year period that is to 
commence once one-half of lots in the preceding phase have been sold. (R. pp. 24-25 .) The 
parties also agreed that, with respect to the then completed phase ( called Triple Crow11 
Subdivision Number 1 ("Phase 1 ")), no more lots may be sold until the parties or the District 
Cami determined the development costs for that phase.4 (R. p. 25.) 
On February 6, 20 15, the District Court entered an Amended Judgment that, among other 
things, 1) adopted the parties' stipulation regarding the development of the Prope1ty in phases; 2) 
outlined what constitutes the "net profits" of the Property in which Hull had a one-half interest; 
3) provided that a master would be appointed to determine the development costs for the 
Property and the "net profits" to be divided between the parties5; and 4) retaining jurisdiction of 
3 The parties late r stipulated in open cout1 that the sum of$25,l22.00 represents the value of the irrigation 
equ ipment, and , rather than attempt to determine how much equipment wou ld have been removed upon sa le of any 
specific lot, the parties shall pro-rate reimbursement for the irrigation equipment on an acreage basis, per lot. (R. p. 
224.) Accord ingly, for each lot, $233. 19 ($25,122.00 divided by 107.73 acres) would be multiplied by the lot's 
acreage and then added to the sale price. (R. pp. 224-25.) 
" At the time, only one lot in Phase I had been sold (which is referred to by the parties as the "N ix Lot"). (R. p. 25.) 
The buyer of that lot was the owner of N ix Excavating, Inc. (a contractor that performed wo rk on the Property), and 
Hu ll reserved the right to challenge the cond itions of that sa le in order to increase Hull ' s share of profits from that 
sale. (R. p. 25.) 
5 The District Court's Arnended .Judgment also provided that the master wou ld determine the reasonableness of the 
sa le of the Nix Lot. (R. p. 28.) 
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the matter to resolve further disputes and approve or reject the master' s decisions.6 (R. pp. 27-
31.) The District Court appointed Larry Braga as master to determine the development costs and 
net profits for lots subject to the District Comt's Amended Judgment. (R. pp. 39-43.) 
The master completed and fil ed his report with the District Court on January 15 2016. 
(R. p. 55.) The District Comt accepted the master's report and provided the parties a time frame 
in which to file objections to the report. (R. p. 55.) The parties objected to the master' s report. 
(R. p. 57.) On March 3, 2016, the District Court entered an Order Re: 1\1aster Report and 
Appointment, in which it considered the various objections to the master' s report, dete1mined 
certain legal issues, and attempted to provide fu1ther guidance to the master. (R. pp. 57- 78.) 
Both parties filed motions to reconsider the District Court's Order Re: Mas/er Report and 
Appointment. (See R. p. 79.) On March 23, 2016, the District Comi decided such motions 
without hearing, oral argument or further briefing. (R. pp. 79-83.) In so doing, the District 
Court terminated the appointment of the master and disregarded the master's report, rescinded its 
recent orders, and ordered all unresolved issued between the paities to be decided by a court trial 
set for the summer of 2016. (R. pp. 80- 81.) 
Prior to trial , Hull moved for summary judgment on various alleged development costs 
and other claimed expenses of developing the Prope1ty. (R. pp. 87- 190.) The District Court 
promptly denied Hull ' s motion without hearing or further briefing as there existed material 
issues of fact pertaining to each of the issues raised by Hull. (R. pp. 191-92.) 
Trial was held on July 26 to 29, 2016. (See R. p. 222.) On August 4, 2016, the District 
Court issued a memorandum opinion setting forth its findings of fact and cone] usions of law with 
6 The Amended Judgment was altered or restated multiple times to correct errors and refine certain orders. (See R. 
pp. 44- 54.) 
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respect to the outstanding issues in the case. 7 (R. pp. 222-45.) The District Court later issued a 
supplemental opinion with respect to certain issues on which it had requested further evidence. 
(R. pp. 246-51.) The District Comt entered a Judgement on August 15, 2016, confirming the 
accountings set forth in its memorandum opinions. (R. pp. 252- 53.) 
Hull later moved filed a motion for reconsideration and correction with respect to the 
District Comt' s memorandum decisions. (R. pp. 254- 67.) That motion was denied as untimely; 
however, the District Court did correct ce1tain e1rnrs in its prior reimbursement calculations. (R. 
pp. 276- 80.) 
On September 22, 2016, Hull filed a notice of appeal from the District Court's 
judgments, which notice of appeal was subsequently amended by Hull. (R. pp. 291- 93.) On 
October 20, 2016, this Court conditionally dismissed Hull's appeal because the District Court's 
judgments were not final judgments. (See R. p. 294.) The District Court subsequently entered a 
Partial Judgment in attempt to comply with the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. (See R. pp. 
288- 89.) However, that judgment was also not a final judgment, so this Cornt again 
conditionally dismissed the appeal. (R. p. 294.) On December 22, 2016, the District Comt 
entered an Amended Judgment, which judgment was considered an appealable judgment from 
which Hull ' s appeal could continue. (R. p. 300.) 
As directed by this Court, Hull fil.ed an Amended Notice of Appeal. R. 301-06. Giesler 
thereafter filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal. (R. pp. 308- 11.) 
7 The District Cowt expressly provided that its Memorandum Opinion for Ji,i/y 2016 Trial superseded any prior 
findings of fact and conclusions relating to the master (including the March 3, 20 16 Order Re: Master Report and 
Appointment). (R. p. 223.) 
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IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Is Giesler entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal? 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL 
Giesler hereby expressly waives the right to pursue issues on cross-appeal, and leaves the 
only issues to be considered on appeal as those properly raised by Hull in his Appellant 's Brief 8 
VI. ARGUMENT 
1. Did Hull waive his assignments of error on appeal by failing to adequately support 
them with argument and authority? 
It is a basic requirement of appellate practice that an appelJant' s brief must contain 
argument "with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied 
upon." I.A.R. 35(a)(6); Bolognese v. Forte 153 Idaho 857,866,292 P.3d 248,257 (2012); Suits 
v. Idaho Bd. Of Prof'/ Discipline, 138 ldaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003) (the court will 
not search the record on appeal for error). Idaho appellate courts have refused to consider claims 
on appeal when there is a failure to support the claims with relevant argument and authority or 
coherent thought. Jorgensen v. Coppedge, 15 Idaho 524, 528, 181 P.3d 450, 454 (2008). 
Likewise, an appellate court wi U not address issues on appeal when an appellant fails "to 
comply with Rule 35(a)(6) by not including citations to the trial testimony when challenging the 
court' s factual findings, in addition to failing to support its assertion with argument and 
8 When a respondent waives or abandons its cross-appeal before argument, the dispos ition of the cross-appeal does 
prevent the respondent from being found the prevai ling patty on appea l with respect to the issues ultimately 
considered by the appellate court. See e.g., Glenn v. Go/zinger, 106 Idaho I 09, JI 0, 675 P.2d 824, 825 (1984) 
(respondent was prevailing party after express ly waiving right to pursue cross-appeal and prevailing on remaining 
issues on appea l); Idaho Power Co. v. Cogeneration, Inc., 134 Idaho 738, 75 1, 9 P.3d 1204, 12 17 (2000) (waiver of 
cross-appeal did not prevent award of costs to respondent as prevailing party); Desfosses v. Desfosses, 120 Idaho 27, 
31- 32, 813 P.2d 366, 370- 71 (Ct. App. 1991) (waiver of cross-appea l did not prevent award of costs to respondent 
as prevail ing party). 
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authority." Vanderwa!v. A/bar, Inc. , 154 Idaho 816, 822,303 P.3d 175, 181 (2013). This 
refusal applies to cases in which the appellant merely makes general attacks on findings and 
conclusions of the district court, without specifically referencing the evidentiary or legal e1Tors, 
as well as when an issue is simply mentioned in passing without providing cogent argument or 
authority. Bach v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1153 (2010). Such deficiencies 
and noncompliance with the Idaho Appellate Rules results in a waiver of the unsupported 
assignments of error. Id; Bolognese, 153 Idaho at 866-67. Finally, the aforementioned waiver 
applies even if supporting authority is later supplied in the reply brief. Bach, 148 Idaho at 791. 
The vast majority of Hull's Appellant 's Brief fails to comply with the requirements of 
I.A.R. 35(a). To begin, the Appellant's Bri~flists eleven "Issues Presented on Appeal." 
Appellant's Brief, pp. 4- 5. However, the Appellant 's Brief does not contain any argument with 
respect to at least seven of the issues raised by 1-Iull.9 Due to Hull failing to further address those 
issues with relevant argument and authority, this Court should refuse to even consider such 
issues. Jorgensen, 15 Idaho at 528. 
Hull fails to provide a statement of facts from which this Court can even begin to 
understand the factual background of this case. Instead, Hull simply references terms such as 
"Belmont/Emerald," "Phase 1 ""remaining 107 acres" as well as making mention of farming 
operations and water delivery systems, all without any coherent explanation as to what exactly 
those terms refer and the relationship between them. Similarly, there is a complete lack of any 
citation to the record with respect to the factual underpinnings of this appeal. This Court was 
simply left to search the record itself to gain any understanding of the factual background of this 
case necessary to follow and consider the issues raised on appeal. 
9 Specifically, the issues Hul l listed as Paragraphs D, E, F, G, H, I and J. See Appellant 's Brief, pp. 4-5. 
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Likewise, when arguing that the District Court erred, the Appellant 's Brief is replete with 
conclusory statements and assumptions that are without citations to the record from which this 
Court can evaluate Hull 's allegations and/or the District Court's findings. Examples of the 
foregoing include: 
• "the Trial Court has included in its decision, reimbursement of costs attributable to 
expenses clearly incurred exclusively for farming operations and from Belmont/Emerald 
expenses. Those costs appear in numerous categories regarding expenses allowed for 
upgrading the irrigation system, electrical upgrades, operation of a private water 
company and expenses incurred exclusively for fa rming." Appellant 's Brief, p. 3. 
• "the Trial Court went forward and made two separate rulings allowing 'front loading' of 
development costs from Phase 2 into Phase l ." Appellant 's Brief, p. 12. 
• "More problematic are the costs which the Trial Court carried fo rward from the original 
Belmont/Emerald Subdivision as allowable expenses to Triple Crown Phase 1. The Trial 
Court allowed innumerable expenses incmred in 2006-2007 from Belmont/Emerald even 
though the Trial Court had stated that Respondent Giesler was solely responsible fo r 
development costs from the Belmont/Emerald phase of the subdivision." Appellant 's 
Brief, p. 12. 
• "Numerous other examples exist of expenses which the Trial Court allowed Respondent 
to carry into the Triple Crown development; costs that although they were clearly 
incurred either for the earlier development of Belmont/Emerald or were costs that were 
being 'front loaded' from Phase 2 were allowed as Triple Crown costs." Appellant's 
Brief, p. 12. 
• "The Trial Court also allowed as recoupable expenses, charges which Appellant had 
never seen either in discovery or at the time of trial." Appellant's Brief, p. 17. 
With respect to the foregoing allegations, Hull does not make any citation to the record, or 
provide appropriate context, from which any alleged error can be judged. Hull does not specify 
which of the expenses were incurred for farming operations or Belmont/Emerald costs. Hull 
does not specify or cite the decisions of the District Cou11 in which there is allegedly improper 
"front loading" of costs. Hull does not specify which costs were "carried forward" from 
Belmont/Emerald. Hull did not specify which allowed expenses he had never seen in discovery 
or at trial. 
The deficiencies noted in the preceding paragraph are fatal to Hull ' s appeal. The District 
Court made numerous decisions in this case over course of the fi ve years since thi s case was 
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commenced-including multiple decisions since Hull I. Hull's Lack of citation to the 
complained-of decisions leaves this Court to guess as to which one ( of the many decisions of the 
District Court) that Hull alleges contain errors. Similarly, with respect to reimbursable 
development costs found fo llowing the most recent trial, 10 there were dozens of individual costs 
of which the District Court fow1el Giesler was entitled to reimbursement. HuIJ 's lack of 
specification leaves this Court to simply search the record and then guess at which ones of the 
dozens of costs are the particular ones HuJJ takes issue with. 11 
With regard to authority to support his legal arguments, the Appellant 's Brief does 
contain some citations to authority; however, those citations are simply general rules applied to 
the interpretation of contracts. Hull belabors the point that implied tenns in a contract should be 
reasonable, but fai ls to specify which rulings (with citations to the specific orders and judgments 
in the record) and contract tem1s were not reasonable. Additionally, Hull fails to cite any 
authority to support his arguments that the District Court's rulings limiting the testimony of Greg 
Ruddell ("Ruddell") were not consistent with applicable legal standards. 
Hull ' s Appellant 's Brief consists mainly of genera l, unsupported, conclusory, and 
incoherent attacks on the District Court's decisions without putting fo1ih an adequate legal or 
factual basis for his arguments. It is not the reviewing court's burden to search the record for 
error. Vanderwal, l 54 Idaho at 822. Consequently, Hull has waived his unsupported 
assignments of error and this Court should refuse to consider such claims.12 Id.; Dawson v. 
10 See R. pp. 222- 51. 
11 Hull does make some citations to the trial transcript when referencing questions the District Court posed to the 
litigants at trial. However, those questions were posed during the trial, and do not account for the various testimony 
and evidence that was subsequently provided on the issues. Moreover, it is the ultimate find ings and conclusions of 
the District Court that were appealed (not the District Court's questions or comments at trial), and Hull fa ils to direct 
this Comt the alleged error in those findings by citation to the record. 
12 The waiver of error will remain even in the event Hull realizes the defic ient nature of his Appellant 's Brief and 
attempts to rectify the lack of citation and/or support in his reply brief. Bach, l 48 Idaho at 79 1. 
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Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 382- 83 , 234 P.3d 699, 706- 07 (201 0). Nevertheless, 
even if Hull ' s claims are considered, the District Court did not err and its decisions should be 
upheld on appeal. 
2. Did the District Court err when determining development costs for Phase 1? 
"The review of a trial court's decision after a court trial is limited to ascertaining 
'whether the evidence supports the findings of fact, and whether the fi ndings of fact support the 
conclusions of law. '" Griffith v. Clear Lakes Trout Co., Inc. , 143 Idaho 733, 737, 152 P.3d 604, 
608 (2007) (quoting Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 135 
Idaho 31 6, 319, 17 P.3d 260,263 (2000)) . McCormick Int 'l USA, Inc. v. Shore, 152 Idaho 920, 
923, 277 P.3d 367, 370 (201 2); Idaho R. Civ. P. 52(a). "Factual findings are not clearly 
erroneous if they are supported by substantial and competent, although conflicting, evidence." 
McCormick Int 'l USA, 152 Idaho at 923. "Evidence is substantial if a reasonable trier of fact 
would accept it and rely on it." A.spiazu v. Mortimer, 139 Idaho 548, 550, 82 P.3d 830, 832 
(2003). Further, because of "the tria l court's role to weigh confl icting evidence and testimony 
and to judge the credibili ty of witnesses, the trial court 's findings of fact will be liberally 
construed in favo r of the judgment entered." Griffith, 143 Idaho at 737. 
a. The decision as to the reimbursable development costs is a factual 
determination to be made by the District Court. 
Hull argues that the determination of which development costs of Phase 1 that are 
reimbursable to Giesler is a question of law that this Court should free ly review. See Appellant 's 
Brief, pp. 7-8. This argument appears to be based on the presumption that because the District 
Court supplied a "missing contract term" (i.e. , re imbursement of development costs) all 
determinations with respect to development costs are legal questions subject to free review by 
this Court. Hull also presumes that development costs awarded by the District Court must meet 
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a reasonableness standard, even though the District Court did not so limit reimbursable costs 
when declaring the parties' rights and obligations under the their contract. 
This Court has held that only reasonable terms should be implied into contracts. Star 
Phoenix Jvfin. Co. v. Hecla M in. Co., 130 Idaho 223, 231 , 939 P.2d 542, 550 (1997). Such terms 
are implied not because they are reasonable, but because they are necessary to effectuate the 
intent of the contracting parties. Id. This Court's instructions simply require the implied terms 
themselves to be necessary and reasonable, not that the ultimate performance of those terms also 
be measured by a reasonableness requirement. 
In the present case, the term the District Court implied in the parties' contract was that 
Hull was entitled to one-half of the "net profits" of each lot in the Property that was sold. See 
Hull 1, 156 Idaho at 772. The District Court fm1her defined "net profits" as the gross selling 
price of each lot minus selling costs and minus the pro-rata share of acquisition costs and 
development costs. 13 Id. It is those two terms that were implied and must be reasonable. The 
reasonableness standard does not trickle down to each determination that is made as a result of 
the inclusion of tenns in the contract. Accordingly, the reasonableness inquiry is not at the 
development cost level, but rather with respect to the decision that Giesler be reimbursed 
development costs (and that development costs be used to calculate net profits). 
Hull has not challenged the reasonableness of the District Court' s determination that 
development costs be included in the net profit calculation that ultimately determines any profit 
in which Hull is to share. Rather, Hull concedes that development costs are properly included 
13 Giesler notes that the Disn·ict Court did not use the tenn " reasonable deve lopment costs" when defining net 
profits. 
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(i.e., reasonable) in the calculation of profits for Phase 1. 14 See Appe!Lant 's Brief, p. 9. 
Accordingly, the finding then required by the District Court was simply what were the 
development costs of Phase 1. Such inquiry is unquestionably a question of fact, not of law. 
Furthermore, to the extent there is a reasonableness component implied or applied to the 
amount of development costs, that reasonableness inquiry would also be a question of fact. 
Reasonableness determinations with respect to contractual terms are factual inquires. See e.g. , 
Hull I, 156 Idaho at 778 (whether time frames for developing phases of a subdivision are 
reasonable was a question of fact); Smith v. Meridian Joint Sch. Dist. No. 2, 128 Idaho 714, 720, 
918 P.2d 583, 589 (1996) (whether a period of probation included in an employment contract is 
reasonable is a question of fact) ; G & H Land & Cattle Co. v. Heitzman & Nelson, Inc. 102 
Idaho 204, 208, 628 P .2d 1038, 1042 (1981) (what is a reasonable time in which to inspect goods 
for conformance with the contract is a question of fact). Accordingly, to the extent it is required 
that the development costs for Phase 1 must be reasonable, any review of the District Court's 
findings with respect to such development costs should be upheld if supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
The District Cowt' s findings with respect to reimbursable development costs for Phase 1 
were findings of fact. Consequently, any review by this Court of such find ings should be limited 
to asce1taining whether the evidence produced at trial suppo1ts the District Court's findings on 
the issue of development costs. As set fo1th below, Giesler provided the District Court with 
an1ple evidence to support its development cost conclusions. 
14 And in any event, inclusion of costs is clearly reasonable when calculating profits. Further, this Cou,t in Hull! 
affirmed the District Court' s findings with respect to the parties' contract and Hull ' s interest in the profits from the 
sale of lots in the Prope1ty. 
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b. The District Court's conclusions as to development costs for Phase 1 were 
supported by substantial and competent evidence. 
Hull asserts that the District Court erred with respect to various factual findings made 
following the latest trial in this matter, including those that relate to allocation of development 
expenses between phases , the amount of costs for developing Phase 1, pressurized inigation 
equipment, and farming expenses. Hull does not argue that the District couii ' s findings of fact 
are not supported by substantial and competent evidence. Instead, Hull simply implies-tlu·ough 
unsupported, conclusory statements- that the District Corui ' s findings were not reasonable. 
Furthennore, Hull, with very few exceptions does not even provide citations to the record to 
suppo1t his factual and legal argmnents. 
In this case, the District Court awarded Giesler reimbursement of what were referred to 
as "direct costs" of development, which costs were directly attributable to Phase 1 and were 
grouped in eight categories. 15 (R. pp. 229- 31 .) The District Comi also awarded reimbursement 
of what were referred to as "indirect costs" of development, which were costs that related to the 
entire Prope1ty and were grouped into three categories. 16 (R. pp. 231-32.) The District Court 
made findings as to what the total indirect costs were for the entire Property, and then calculated 
the portion attr ibutable to Phase 1. (See R. pp. 231-32.) 
With respect to direct costs fo r ditch removal, Giesler testified that a concrete ditch and 
gravel road traversed Phase 1 and were removed to provide clear, buildable lots. (Tr. p. 42, l. 3 
top. 44, 1. 4; Defendant' s Exhibit 6-A.) Giesler testified that he hired Mountain Grain & 
Fertilizer to remove the ditch and gravel road. (Tr. p. 43 , 11. 18- 21.) Giesler testified that he was 
15 Those costs were " Removal of a ditch: $18,000"; " Roads, demolition/cleanup: $2 l 9,785 .61" ; "Pressurized water 
system: $63,943.18"; "El-lM engineering: $42,848.00"; 'IdaJ10 Power: $34,926.00"; "Fees: $8749 .64"; "Labor and 
Misc: $724 1.58"; and "2015 expenses: $5677 .07 ." (R. p. 229.) 
16 Those costs were ldaho Power costs totaling $124,564.00, engineering costs totaling $ 15 ,029.00, and subdivision 
entrance costs totaling $5 1 368.21. (R. p. 23 1.) 
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invoiced and paid $ 18,000.00 to Mountain Grain & Fertilizer for the ditch/road removal. (Tr. p. 
45, l. 5 top. 48, L 9; Defendant' s Exhibits 6-B to 6-C.) 
With respect to roads and demolition/cleanup, Giesler testified that there were old feed 
lots, buildings, trees and other "junk" located on the Property (and adjacent real property) that 
were in rough shape and an eyesore to the subdivision being developed by Giesler. (Tr. p. 49, 1. 
8 to p. 52, 1. 6; Defendant's Exhibits 7-A to 7-B.) Giesler testified that he hired various persons 
to demolish the feed lots, buildings, trees, etc. and haul them off in order to improve its 
appearance and the marketability oflots in Phase 1. (See Tr. p. 53, 1. 6 to p. 54, I. 5.) Giesler 
also testified that he constructed various roads within Phase 1 to provide access to the lots. (See 
Tr. p. 56, I. 2 to p. 58, I. 6; Defendant ' s Exhibits 7-C to 7-E.) Giesler testified as to amounts he 
was invoiced and paid to Idaho Sand & Gravel Company, Road Work Ahead Construction 
Supply, Lancaster Trenching Inc. , Eureka Construction & Excavating, Inc., Jim Thorpe, Thorpe 
Demolition & Excavation LLC, and Nix Excavating, Inc. for the demolition/cleanup costs and 
construction of roads within Phase 1. (Tr. p. 58, 1. 7 top. 83, I. 15; Defendant's ExJ1ibits 7-H to 
7-T.) 
As for the pressmized irrigation system, Giesler testified that the system was installed in 
approximately 201 3 in order to provide increased capacity for delivering irrigation water the lots 
in the Prope11y other than the Belmont/Emerald subdivision. (Tr. p. 87, l. 21 top. 91, I. 19.) 
Giesler testified as to the components making up the system and how they work together. (See 
Tr. p. 91 , I. 20 to. p. 98, 1. 8.) Giesler testified that he hired Sliman & Butler Irrigation, Inc. to 
extend the pressuri zed irrigation system. (Tr. p. 90, I. 4 to p. 91, I. 11.) Giesler did not dispute 
that some of the charges and invoices for the parts of system may be related to farming, but he 
identified those amounts at trial and testified that he did not inc lude them in the claimed 
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development costs. (See Tr. p. 99, I. 1 top. 101 , I. 14.) Giesler testified that he was invoiced and 
paid $63.943 .18 in non-farm related expenses to Sliman & Butler Irrigation, Inc. and Farmore of 
Idaho for irrigation system expenses. (Tr. p. 95, I. 17 top. 103, I. 8; Defendant's Exhibits 9-B to 
9-E.) 
With respect to costs for EHM engineering, Gies ler testified that the engineers assisted 
with surveying and platting of Phase 1 as paii of the larger subdivision plan, as well as going 
before the local zoning authority to get approval for Phase 1. (See Tr. p. 105, I. 15 to p. 106, I. 
17.) Giesler testified that he was invoiced and paid $42,848.00 to EHM Engineers, Inc. for 
engineering services related to Phase 1. (Tr. p. 106, I. 18 top. I 07, I. 19; Defendant ' s Exhibits 
l 0-A to 10-B.) 
As for direct costs of Idaho Power, Giesler testified that in 2014 it was necessary to 
trench and install underground power lines in order to provide electricity to each lot in Phase 1. 
(Tr. p. 108, 1. 20 top. 110, I. 17.) Giesler testified that he was invoiced and paid Idaho Power 
$34,926.00 to install power to the lots in Phase 1. (Tr. p. 109, 1. 17 top. 11 3, I. 1 O; Defendant 's 
Exhibit 11-A to 11-E.) 
The direct cost category of "Fees" included various fees of Twin Falls County, Idaho and 
Giesler's legal counsel with respect to Phase 1. Giesler testified that these amounts related to 
planning and zoning fees of the county, legal work for drafting supplemental irrigation 
agreements and restricti ve covenants, as wel l as purchase of an easement. (Tr. p. 114, I. 2 1 to p. 
119, I. 24.) Giesler testified that he was charged and paid a total of $8,749.64 for the county 
fees, legal fees, and easement purchase. (Tr. p. 120, II. 3- 5; Defendant' s Exhibits 12-A to 12-E.) 
As to labor and miscellaneous costs, Giesler explained that these costs included various 
labor costs to maintain and prepare the lots in Phase 1 for sale. Giesler testified that the costs 
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were for work including weed removal and control, picking rock, lot clean-up, cleaning out 
culverts, as well as storage costs for mailboxes that were used in Phase 1. (See Tr. p. 123, 1. 12 
top. 126, 1. 20.) Giesler testifi ed and provided evidence that he paid a total of $7,241.58 fo r the 
aforementioned work. (Tr. p. 128, II. 12- 15; Defendant 's Exhibits 13-A to 13-C.) 
The 2015 expenses claimed by Giesler included costs for tree trimming, installation of 
mailboxes, weed control, drilling of test holes, sprink ler hookups, accounting fees, and legal fees 
related to Phase 1. (See Tr. p. 133, I. 3 to p. 135, I. 2.) Giesler testified that all of these claimed 
costs related to Phase 1. (Tr. p. 135, II. 3-5.) Giesler further provided evidence that the total of 
the 2015 expenses that he paid was $5,677.07. (Defendant's Exhibits 15-A to 15-C.) 
As for the indirect engineering costs, Giesler explained at tri al that after acquiring the 
Prope11y from Hull in 2005, he engaged the engineering firm of Reidesel & Associates, Inc. to 
perform various tasks including nitric pathogen studies, locate survey corners, prepare 
preliminary plats, and obtain fi nal plats. (Tr. p. 141 , 1. 12 to p. 142, I. 25.) Giesler provided 
summaries and breakdowns of the various engineering charges and the different parts of the 
Property that they applied to. (See Defendant' s Exhibits 2-A to 2-H; see also Tr. p. 145, I. 11 to 
p. 147, I. 14.) The engineering costs submitted by Giesler specified $ 15,029.00 in costs 
allocated to portions of the Property other than the Belmont/Emerald subdivision. (See Tr. p. 
147, 11. 10- 14; Defendant's Exhibit 2-G.) Giesler testified that he paid all of the Reidesel & 
Associates, Inc. billings he received. (Tr. p. 147, II. 17- 19; Defendant' s Exhibit 2-E.) 
Giesler testified at trial that the main entryway to the Property includes various 
landscaping, fencing, sculptures, and signage. (Tr. p. 151, ll. 2-23; Defendant's Exhibit 3-A.) 
Giesler explained that the entryway was constructed in 2007 to benefi t the entire Property, 
including Phase 1. (Tr. p . I 51, I. 24 top. 152, I. 9.) Giesler further provided the District Court 
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with a detailed breakdown of the various costs of each component of the entrance way, which 
totaled $5 1,368.21. (See Tr. p. 154, I. 9 top. 155, I. 2; Defendant's Exhibits 3-B to 3-D.) 
The indirect Idaho Power costs claimed by Giesler related to the costs of upgrading the 
main power line leading to the Property. Giesler explained that when he acquired the Property 
from Hull , the existing power line the vicinity required upgrading in order to support the 
development proposed for the Property. (Tr. p. 157, I. 22 top. 158, l. 3.) The required upgrades 
included reengineering the power system, trenching, and running over a mile and one-half of 
new power line. (Tr. p. 158, I. 4 to p. 160, 1. 8.) Giesler testified how the Idaho Power upgrades 
appl ied to the various portions of the Property, and provided the District Court with evidence to 
show the total costs ($124,564.00) incurred with respect to the power upgrade. (See generally, 
Tr. p. 160, I. 19 top. 166, I. 8; Defendant's Exhibits 4-A to 4-S.) 
As sununarized above, Giesler testified at trial to each category of development costs 
ultimately awarded by the District Court. Giesler testified as to the specific work completed, the 
costs he incurred, the amounts he paid, and that the claimed costs were related to Phase 1 ( or if 
ce1tain costs were not related to Phase 1 that they were not included in the amounts submitted to 
the District Court) . (See generally Tr. pp. 42- 207.) Further, admitted as exhibits were copies of 
invoices and payments related to such costs, as well explanations and summaries as to how costs 
were allocated to the various aspects of the development and parts of the Property. (See 
generally Defendant's Exhibits 2-A to 2-H, 3-A to 3-D, 4-A to 4-S, 5-A, 6-B to 6-C, 7-H to 7-T, 
8-A to 8-B, 9-B to 9-E, 10-A to 10-C, 11 -A to 11 -E, 12-A to 12-E, 13-A to 13-C, 14-A to 14-B, 
15-A to 15-C, 16-A.) 
The foregoing testimony and documentation provides substantial and competent evidence 
to support the findings of the District Court with respect to the development costs reimbursable 
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to Giesler. Consequently, the District Court did not err when determining the development costs 
for Phase I , and its judgments related thereto should be affirmed. 
3. Did the District Court err bv refusing to allow Greg Ruddell to testify as to what 
charges applied to Phase 1? 
At trial, Hull attempted to introduce various testimony by Ruddell, who was presented as 
both an expert witness and lay witness. 
a. Mr. Ruddell's testimony as an expert. 
To promote candor and fa irness during the discovery process, the Idaho Rules of Civil 
Procedure require litigants to identify experts that will testify at trial and provide complete 
statements of the expert opinions to be expressed by such experts. See I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A). If 
there is a lack of compliance with those requirements, the offending party will typically be 
prevented from admitting such evidence. Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 89,8 13 P.2d 
897, 900 ( 199 1 ). When expert testimony is at issue, compliance with expert disclosure 
requirements becomes more critical. Id. ; Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457, 466, 337 P.3d 616,625 
(2014). 
In Zylstra v. State, thi s Court was confronted wi th the situation in which a party was 
presented with discovery requests seeking information about any expert the party intended to call 
as a witness at trial, the subject matter of the testimony, the facts the expert would rely upon, any 
and all opinions to which the expert was expected to testify, and any pertinent repo1is generated 
by the expert (including materials relied upon in generating the reports). See generally 152 
Idaho at 462. The party responded with only a generalized subject matter disclosure and short 
statement as to expected testimony, but did not disclose the actual expert opinions. Id. at 464. 
This Comi affirmed the district court' s exclusion of later testimony from those experts, reasoning 
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that "Rule 26(b) requires more than placing an opponent on notice' of what your expert is 
' likely' to testify to 'if asked' his opinion." Id. at 467. 
At trial, Giesler's counsel explained that during discovery Hull was asked to identify 
expe1is that would testify at trial, the subject matter of the expert testimony the substance of the 
expert's opinions/conclusions, plus the underlying facts and data on which such opinions were 
based. (See Tr. p. 278, ll. 9- 14.) Hull simply responded "Greg Ruddell; Mr. Ruddell will 
testify as to the reasonableness of extensive requests by defendant, land valuation, and 
development costs. He' s relied upon the data provided by plaintiff to defendants." (Tr. p. 278, 
11. 14-18.) HulJ did not provide reports of Ruddell, instead Hull simply included with his 
discovery responses a stack of proposed exhibits, which he asserts encompass and adequately 
disclose Ruddell ' s alleged expert opinions. (See Tr. p. 280, l. 17 top. 282, I. 2.) Such 
"disclosures" do not meet the expert disclosure requirements discussed in Zylstra. 
The inadequacy of Hull's expert disclosures was on display at trial when confronted with 
objections to ce1tain proffered testimony. For example, when presented with an objection to 
expert opinion in relation to road cost calculations, Hull was unable to point to where it was 
disclosed that Ruddell would provide an opinion on that subject- instead he could on..Iy respond 
that it was referenced in the stacks of exhibits. (Tr. p. 493, 1. 23 to p. 494 l. 24.) Such exchange 
plainly demonstrates the inadequacy of disclosures with respect to Ruddell ' s opinions as an 
expert. Accordingly, the District Court did not err by not prohibiting Ruddell from providing 
expert opinions not adequately disclosed.17 
17 Further, I-lull has the burden of provid ing an adequate record to show the court below erred . W. Cmty. Ins. Co. v. 
Kickers, Inc., 137 Idaho 305, 306, 48 P.3d 634, 635 (2002). When a party fails to provide the documentation vital to 
understanding a lower cotui's dec ision, there is in inadequate record which prevents the court on appeal from finding 
that the lower court erred. Vanderwal, 154 Idaho at 823. Hull failed to include the disputed discovery disclosures in 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 23 -
For experts that have been properly disclosed, the standards for admission of expert 
testimony as evidence are set forth in Idaho Rule of Evidence 702. This Court explained that 
those standards allow expert testimony when the subject of the testimony is "beyond common 
experience and allowing an expert to testify on the issue wi 11 assist the trier of fact." State v. 
Hester, 114 Idaho 688, 692- 93, 760 P.2d 27, 31- 32 (1988). 
This Court has previously dealt with the situation in which a witness was allegedly 
providing "expert" testimony, but was really being used as a conduit for inadmissible hearsay or 
opinion evidence. In State v. Vondenkamp a conservator was presented as an "expert" to testify 
as whether checks wtitien on accounts of the protected person were for that person's benefit. 
See generally 141 Idaho 878, 119 P.3d 653 (Ct. App. 2005). The conservator testified that after 
being appointed conservator she investigated the protected person's accounts, called payees to 
discuss whether the protected person had an account with that entity, and compiled documents 
from her investigations into charts and other material introduced into evidence. id. at 886. The 
conservator was asked to testify as an "expert" to conclusions, based on her investigation, as to 
whether particular checks written on the protected person' s accounts were for that person's 
benefit. Id. at 886- 87. The Court of Appeals held that the district court erred in permitting such 
"expert" testimony because such testimony had little to do with particular expertise as a 
conservator, and did not involve matters beyond common experience. id at 887. The Court 
further explained that the function of the improper "expe11" testimony was "to convert 
inadmissible hearsay declarations of the contacted entities into admissible 'opinions' and to 
render the same conclusion, in part, that the jury was asked to reach, i.e., whether [ checks written 
on the protected person' s account were for such person's benefit]." id. It was err on the district 
the record on appeal. Consequently, error cannot be presumed, and the District Court' s decisions on this issue should 
be upheld. 
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cow-t's part to qualify the conservator to testify as an expert on matters not in need of expert 
testimony, and the "expert opinion" testimony did not assist the trier of fact within the meaning 
of I.R.E. 702. Id. 
In the present case, the "expert" testimony of Ruddell is the same situation presented in 
Vondenkamp. Ruddell basically testified that he gathered invoices, receipts, acc0tmting records, 
zoning files, etc. with respect to the Property. (See generally Tr. p. 471, l. 1 top. 473, l. I.) 
From that investigation, Ruddell formed an opinion as to whether certain expenses related to 
Phase l , and produced various spreadsheets and summaries setting forth his opinions. (See 
generally Tr. p. 471 , l. I top. 483, I. 7.) Hull attempted to solicit testimony of such opinions 
and the exhibits prepared by Ruddell. 
Even prior to Ruddell 's testimony, the parties and the District Court discussed whether 
such testimony would be admissible. The District Court explained that if Ruddell was to be 
qualified as an "expe11," that he must provide evidence that would assist the trier of fact based on 
specialized knowledge. (Tr. p. 284, II. 3-8.) The District Court further warned Hull that if 
Ruddell was going to simply testify as to how development costs should be allocated "you're just 
wasting your time because that' s not what an expert is here to do . .. . The issue is that's for me 
to decide." (Tr. p. 284, 11. 8- 13.) 
Despite the District Court's admonition, Hull proceeded with attempts to inquire of 
Ruddell what his opinion was with regards to whether certain amounts should be allocated to 
development costs for Phase 1. The District Court sustained objections that Ruddell was 
providing improper "expert" testimony, and simply giving lay witness testimony for which there 
was no need. (Tr. p. 483, I. 25 top. 485, l. I 0.) The District Com1 explained that Ruddell had 
inadequate foundation for hi s opinions, Ruddell 's opinions were not expert opinions based on his 
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specialized knowledge, and the testimony was not helpful to the District Cowt (i.e., the trier of 
fact) . (Tr. p. 484, 1. 6 top. 485, I. 20.) 
The District Court correctly determined that Ruddell 's opinions were not based on any 
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge, but were instead simple assumptions based 
on information Ruddell acquired. Further, the District Court properly recognized that Ruddell 's 
alleged "expert" testimony was not helpful in assisting it-as the trier of fact-in making its 
ultimate decision on the issues at trial. Rather than assist the District Court, Ruddell (by his 
testimony and exhibits) was simply attempting to tell the District Court how to ultimately decide 
this case. Accordingly, the District Cowt did not err by sustaining objections to Ruddell 
testify ing as an expe1t with respect to determining development costs. 
b. Mr. Ruddell's testimony as a lay witness. 
Permitting a lay witness to state an impression or conclusion within his knowledge rests 
in the tria l court's discretion. State v. Johnson, 199 Idaho 852, 855, 810 P.2d 11 38, 1141 (Ct. 
App. 1991 ). Opinion testimony of lay witness " is limited to those opinions or inferences which 
are (a) rationally based on the perception of the witness and (b) helpful to a clear understanding 
of the testimony of the witness or the determination of a fact in issue." l.R.E. 701. Additionally, 
" lay opinions are subject to the restTiction that when the question is one which can be decided by 
persons of ordinary experience and knowledge, it is fo r the trier of fact to decide." State v. 
Pugsley, 128 Idaho 168, 175, 911 P.2d 761 , 768 (Ct. App. 1995). 
Similarly, it is improper to allow a lay witness to provide as "opinion" testimony 
information relayed to him by others, as the witness is simply passing on the credibility of others. 
Johnson, 11 9 Idaho at 856-58. In the Johnson case, a doctor (not qualified to testify as an 
expert) provided "opinion" testimony that a child had been abused. That opinion testimony was 
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ultimately held to have violated l.R.E. 701 because the doctor's opinion was not based on his 
own perception of abuse, but rather simply what other persons had told him. Id. at 857- 58. The 
court held that the trier of fact had been presented with evidence alleging abuse, as well as 
evidence denying abuse, and the doctor was simply vouching for the credibility of some of that 
evidence- which was improper use of lay witness opinion testimony. Id 
In this case, Ruddell basically testified that he gathered invoices, receipts, accounting 
records, zoning files, etc. with respect to the Property. (See generally Tr. p. 471, l. 1 top. 473, I. 
1.) From that investigation, Ruddell fo rmed an opinion as to whether certa in expenses related to 
Phase 1, and produced various spreadsheets and summaries setting forth hi s opinions. (See 
generally Tr. p. 471 , l. 1 to p. 483, I. 7.) Hull attempted to solicit testimony of such opinions 
and the exhibits prepared by Ruddell. 
As noted above, Ruddell's "opinion" testimony was not helpful in assisting the District 
Court - as the trier of fact- in making its ultimate decision on the issues at trial. In fact, 
Ruddell himself explained that he was simply taking the information provided, comparing it to 
other records, making assumptions, and essentially just lining out what he thought ce11ain 
expenses applied to. (See e.g., Tr. p. 47 1, l. 12 top. 472, I. 8; p. 474, 1. 22 top. 476, 1. 10; p . 481, 
I. 17 to p. 483, l. 24.) Rather than assist the District Court, Ruddell (by his testimony and 
exhibits) was usurping the District Court's role as a trier of fact with respect to determining 
allocation of development expenses. 
Further, Ruddell ' s "opinion" testimony sought by Hull asked for nothing more than 
weighing the credibility of evidence of development expenses. In fact, Ruddell was asked 
directly on multiple occasions whether Giesler's expense evidence is justified . (Tr. p. 474, ll. 1-
10; p. 483, ll. 8- 11 ; p. 493, II. 23-25.) The "opinions" of Ruddell that Hull sought to introduce 
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were a far more blatant attempt to pass judgment on the credibi lity of other evidence than was 
prohibited in Johnson. The Distri ct Court correctly recognized the impropriety and 
unhelpfulness of such testimony, and did not err by sustained objections to the same. 
4. Is Giesler entitled to costs and attorney fees on appeal? 
Giesler requests an award of costs incurred in responding to this appeal pursuant to Idaho 
law, including I.A.R. 40. Giesler also requests an award of attorney fees incurred in defending 
this appeal pursuant to Idaho law, including I.A.R. 41 and Idaho Code sections 12-120 and 12-
12 1. 
Idaho Code section 12-1 20(3) entitles the prevailing party in actions ari sing from a 
commercial transaction to an award of attorney fees. Commercial transactions are "all 
transactions except transactions for personal or household purposes." IdaJ10 Code § 12-1 20(3). 
Section 12-120(3) applies to proceedings before the trial court and those on appeal. Oakes v. 
Boise Hearl Clinic Physicians, PLLC, 152 Idaho 540,546,272 P.3d 512,5 18 (2012). 
The present case clearly involved a commercial transaction. This appeal arose from a 
dispute over the ownership and share of profits from certain real property being developed into 
residential subdivisions. (R. Hull I, pp. 6- 29.) Disputes over agreements and rights to a share of 
profits from the sale of developed lots in a subdivision arise from a commercial transaction. See 
Rockefeller v. Grabow, 139 Idaho 538, 546, 82 P.3d 450, 458 (2003). 
Further, Giesler would also be entitled to an award of attorney fees under Idaho Code 
section 12-1 21 on appeal. Attorney fees may be awarded under section 12- 121 to the prevailing 
patty on appeal if the appellate court is " left with the abiding belief that the entire appeal was 
brought, pursued, or defended frivolously, umeasonably, or without fo undation." Griffith v. 
JumpTime Meridian, LLC, 161 IdaJ10 913, 393 P.3d 573, 576 (2017). Such a situation occurs 
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when the appellant merely asks the reviewing court to second guess the findings and decisions of 
the lower court. Bach, 148 Idaho at 797. Additionally, when an appellant's briefing provides 
"no argument or authority on which reversal of the District Court could be based," there is no 
basis for the appeal and it is brought unreasonably. Id. 
On appeal, Hull has failed to show (or even explain) how the District Court erred, as well 
as provide particularized allegations of error in order to allow this Court to review such alleged 
errors. Further, Hull 's Appellant 's Brief is replete with conclusory statements and unsupported 
by reasoned argument or authority. Instead, he simply makes conclusory statements and merely 
asks this Court to second guess the District Comt' s findings of fact and conclusions of law. 
Therefore, in the event Giesler is the prevailing party on appeal, Giesler is entitled to an 
award of costs and attorney fees pursuant to I.A.R. 40 and 41 and Idaho Code sections 12-1 20(3) 
and 12- 121. 
Vil. CONCLUSION 
Hull waived his claims of error by not presenting thi s Court with an adequate record or 
briefing justify ing his allegations of error. Fwther, the District Court not err when determining 
the development costs for Phase 1 that were reimbursable to Giesler. At trial, the District court 
did not err by refusing to allow Ruddell to testify as to what development charges applied to 
Phase 1. Based on the foregoing, Giesler respectfully request that the District Court's decisions 
be affirmed and that Giesler be awarded costs and attorney fees on appeal. 
Oral argument is requested. 
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DA TED this il day of July, 2017. 
WRIGHT BROTHERS LAW OFFICE, P 
RESPONDENTS ' BRIEF - 30 -
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the J.1 day of July, 2017, I caused two true and correct 
copies of the foregoing document to be served, pursuant to I.A.R. 34(d), upon the following 
persons in the following manner: 
Gery W. Edson 
Gery W. Edson, P.A. 
P.O. Box 448 
Boise, ID 8370 1 
Te1Ty Lee Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box X 
Twin Falls, ID 83303 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF - 3 1 -
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
{-:><) 
[ ] 
[ ] 
[ ] 
;x:r 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid 
Express Mail 
Facsimile 
E-mail 
